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THE LONGEST WAY HOME:
LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY IN DIASPORA
Pradeep A. Dhillon
In this essay I take up the problem of doing non-Western, particularly
Indian, philosophy in English if we take seriously the notion that lan-
guage and thought are linked, in other words, I consider the problem
presented for international philosophical discourse by the claim that
language constrains our metaphysics. The strong version of this thesis
would suggest that it is impossible to do Indian philosophy within an
international context, since the metaphysics of such discourse would
inevitably be cast in English. I wish to argue a weaker version of this
thesis. English is undoubtedly the language of international philoso-
phical discourse, however, this does not imply a single metaphysics
driven by grammar.
If the learning of English facilitates philosophical and cognitive es-
trangements, it also serves a therapeutic purpose. Language, by its very
nature, even when learned under conditions of imperialism, can assist in
overcoming alienation. There are several strategies which could be
taken up to achieve such an overcoming. Once could, for example,
adopt a Calibanesque strategy and use language to build a critique of
epistemological and cognitive displacements. We could embark on a
Foucauldian archaeology of epistemes and make the project recupera-
tive of the threads of non-Western thought within Western philosphy.
Or we could pay attention to language use in relation to diasporic phi-
losophical disocursc. No doubt the question of intellectual freedom in
an international context is a good one for philosophy, but surely it is a
reasonable one to ask of language itself. Such a reflexive examination
would be a task for philosophy proper. In approaching philosophical
discourse in diaspora in this manner, I join efforts with those who have
gone before and those still traveling on this long way home. Home at
the end of such a philosophical journey would not necessarily be a de-
colonized intellectual space; a return to an anthropological 'India" or
'China'. Home is the domain of philosophy brought closer to its own
ideals of universalism.
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Introduction
There is no other way open to us in the East but to go along with Eu-
ropeanization and to go through it. Only through this voyage into the
foreign and the strange can we win back our own selfhood; here as
elsewhere, the way to what is closest to us is the longest way back.
This is the response offered by the Indian philosopher J. L. Mehta 1990 to Ed-
mund Husserl's notion of the inevitability of the 'Europeanization of the earth'.
Linking linguistic and philosophical estrangement to global capitalism in India,
Mehta notes:
The coming of modernity to India signified not merely the impinge-
ment of an alien world of knowledge, ideas, and ideals upon the Indian
consciousness, but of a world which was itself rapidly reaching out
toward a newly conceived future, as well as spreading out its tentacles
to encompass the whole world. Under the colonial origins of his mod-
ernization, the Indian encountered 'philosophy' and 'religion' and
began forthwith the long journey of reinterpreting his tradition in
terms of these Western categories. Most importantly, he began to think
about it in the English language not just to expound it to English
scholars, but as the principal medium of his own self-understanding.
As Socrates did in the Apology, I enter the forum of philosophical discourse
as an exile twice over: exiled once from philosophy in the moment of modernity
marked by Mehta, and twice in taking up the question of philosophy in diaspora.
Struggling to express myself in this forum, I speak as a foreigner. That is, I speak
in a language which is my own and yet not mine. In this chapter I seek to exam-
ine the significance of linguistic and geographic displacements for philosophical
discourse.
Specifically, I take up the problem of doing non-Western, particularly Indian,
philosophy in English if we take seriously the notion that language and thought
are linked. In other words, I consider the problem presented for international phi-
losophical discourse by the claim that language constrains our metaphysics. The
strong version of this thesis would suggest that it is impossible to do Indian phi-
losophy within an international context, since such discourse would inevitability
be cast in the metaphysics of English. I wish to argue a weaker version of this
thesis. While English is undoubtedly the language of international philosophical
discourse, this does not imply a single metaphysics driven by grammar.
If the learning of English, as Mehta 1990 suggests, facilitates philosophical
and cognitive estrangements, it can also be therapeutic. Language, by its very na-
ture, even when learned under conditions of imperialism, can assist in overcoming
alienation. There are several strategies which could be taken up to achieve such
an overcoming. One could, for example, adopt a Calibanesque strategy and use
language to build a critique of epistemological and cognitive displacements. We
could embark on a Foucauldian archaeology of epistemes and make the project of
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philosophy recuperative of the threads of non-Western thought within Western
philosophy. Or we could pay attention to language use in relation to diasporic
philosophical discourse. No doubt the question of intellectual freedom in an in-
ternational context is a good one for philosophy, but surely it is a reasonable one
to ask of language itself. Such a rellexive examination would be a task for phi-
losophy proper. In approaching philosophical discourse in diaspora in this man-
ner, I join efforts with those who have gone before and those still traveling on
this long way home. Home at the end of such a philosophical journey would not
necessarily be a decolonized intellectual space; a return to an anthropological
'India' or 'China'. Home is the domain of philosophy brought closer to its own
ideals of universalism.
The problem of a violated and violating universalism set for philosophy by
history and geography is taken up by contemporary philosophy under the rubric
of postmodernism. This theoretical development remains arrested not only be-
cause of its primarily normative reception, but also because it remains entangled
by the very terms it wishes to discount. If the postmodern charge against univer-
salism, which lies at the very heart of the philosophical endeavor, is to be ad-
dressed, philosophy proper and postmodern theory must do a little more than ei-
ther stand steadfast or place themselves under erasure. Attention to particularity
and concerns for establishing a universal discourse must engage each other.
I turn to this problem with a focus on Indian philosophy, not through an
unawareness of other traditions in exile or nostalgia. Rather, I turn my attention
to Indian philosophy because I feel most comfortable speaking to a tradition I am
reasonably familiar with. But also, importantly, because the cases of Indian and
Chinese philosophical discourse, while complex to treat in this manner, are still the
easier cases. These discourses have found a position, however uncomfortable,
within philosophical discourse as it has come to be defined under conditions of
modernity. A significant portion of the ways in which people make sense of and
act responsibly within their worlds is engaged with so minimally, such as the ma-
jor and minor traditions of the South American and African continents, within
academic philosophical discourse that it makes sense to echo Eric Wolf and speak
of the nonsense of people without a philosophy.
The separation of Indian thought into the domains of 'philosophy' and 're-
ligion', based on a modern, secular. Western metaphysics by both Indian and
European philosophers alike, marks one diasporic moment in the historical narra-
tive of the relation between Indian and European philosophy. The subordination
and incorporation of Indian philosophical discourse under conditions of coloni-
alism marks a second. Gilles Delcuze & Felix Guattari 1994 note that, under con-
ditions of global capitalism, philosophy is Greek, but all philosophers arc strang-
ers. The significance of strangeness, of displacements in thinking, marks a third
dimension in thinking about philosophical discourse in diaspora.
What do these alien philosophers, these intellectual strangers, hope to find
in the Greek miliou'.'They come in search of (he pleasures alTorded by sociability
184 Diaspora, Identity, and Language Communities
through the formation of intellectual associations, the pleasures of unsociability
through the enactment of rivalries, and a taste for opinion inconceivable in an
empire, a taste for the exchange of views, for conversation. These strangers are
said to be critical of the traditions they are fleeing from, and because of their
strangeness, they are able to be critical of the traditions they flee to. Regardless of
how such criticality is enacted, this position presupposes a distinction between
philosophy and religion. Philosophy, in this view, would follow a method of open
inquiry and epistemological skepticism while religion requires faith. Second, this
claim limits philosophy to serving a primarily critical rather than a descriptive or
political function. These are functions that have been taken up by Western phi-
losophers like Wittgenstein and Marx. In other words, Deleuze & Guattari's 1994
claim rests on a view of philosophy which is parochial and narrow even within
the Western tradition.
Various possibilities are offered for philosophy in diaspora by postcolonial
theory. Given the ubiquitous, and arguably democratizing, presence of English in
the contemporary world of letters, and the relationship between the Western and
non-Western worlds which forged this presence, a note of despair enters this at-
tempt at addressing the question regarding the relationship between language
and metaphysics. Given history, then, it seems impossible to realize Indian phi-
losophy on its own terms. Dipesh Chakravarty 1999 writes,
Since Europe cannot after all be provincialized within the institutional
site of the University whose knowledge protocols will always take us
back to the terrain where all contours follow that of my hyperreal
Europe — the project of provincializing Europe must realize within it-
self its own impossibility. It therefore looks to a history that embodies
this politics of despair.
Without giving in to this despair, yet facing the difficulties posed for Indian phi-
losophy by global capitalism, what can we consider possible within postcolonial
theory?
This theory seeks to intervene in dominant intellectual production with the
fuU realization that it runs both with and against Western academic discourse. It
resigns itself to a struggle which is to be fought in small increments. The model of
freedom here is not that of a simplistic mode of resistance. Rather, through its
struggle, it hopes to effect a mutation in dominant discourse. While its methods
are derived from postmodern and poststructural theory, its hopes remain faithful
to the ideals of progress, equality, and freedom; to the ideals of the Enlightenment
which it also seeks to question. Postcolonial discourse has made great strides. In-
tellectuals of Indian origin such as Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha, and Arjun Ap-
padurai command a presence within the most prestigious institutions of higher
education in the West. It can be argued, however, that much of postcolonial dis-
course arises from the existential condition of non-Western academics within
Western academic institutions. Therefore, while postcolonial theory seeks to
speak for other worlds, it remains, in the main, unreflective of the possibility of re-
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producing the very categories it seelcs to resist since the language of the produc-
ers of its discourse, as well as that of its audience, is Western. As I shall strive to
show, this condition is not inherently problematic. I seek to steer a course be-
tween an unreflective attitude towards this relation between language and theory
as also a too despairing understanding of such a linkage. Postcolonial theory, for
all its gains, is not equal to the philosophical task before us.
Another move that might be useful is to undertake a genealogy of modern
philosophy in order to unmask the construction of philosophy as a closed and
bounded system, innocent of contamination by the particularities of language. In
the absence of such an historical approach, Western philosophy can write a long
history of its development, tracing its lineage back to the Greeks, without re-
course to any reference to the members of unruly classes, or women, or the citi-
zens of the many nations it has encountered. Such a mode of inquiry could take
two forms working either independently or with each other. First, one could use
the methods of historical linguistics to develop etymologies of concepts. Thus the
philosopher would seek to link concepts in modern philosophy to those that pre-
cede it with the aim of gaining enough distance temporally and spatially in order
to be able to say something significant about the linkages between earlier, per-
haps non-Western, conceptual forms and contemporary philosophy. This in turn
would enable such a scholar to say something significant about the relationship
between language and metaphysics. While such an analysis might prove very
useful it rests on two assumptions both of which are open to question. These are:
first, this mode of inquiry assumes a shared protosystem, for example a Proto-
Indo-European system. Second, it presumes historical continuity.
A different genealogical strategy, one not based on these assumptions,
would be to undertake a Foucauldian archaeology of epistemes — units of
knowledge. Such an approach presupposes that all forms of intellectual produc-
tion are based on the inescapable link between knowledge and power. Roughly,
philosophical archaeology would involve the taking up of a conceptual system
and unpacking it moment by careful moment, with all the historico-linguistic tools
at hand, to reveal the teeming contestation of traditions, voices, and ideas. It is out
of this contestation, such an argument would seek to show, concepts made victo-
rious by the dynamics of power, arise seemingly serene, pure, unitary, and static.
That is, politics, not nature, offers us a universal metaphysics. Though this ap-
proach is powerful, the problem is that it serves primarily as a corrective to the
concerns of Western philosophy. Despite the importance of this task, it provides
us with no way establishing a dynamic, vigorous, and independent way of doing
philosophy within an international context. Not only does Indian philosophy
stay linked to Western thought, it must always follow. It must pick its way
through the debris of the edifices being deconstructed.
The issue of language and philosophical discourse in diaspora, the contours
of which I have struggled to define so far, I take to be the central problem facing
philosophy today. This is so not for intellectual reasons alone. If we seek to live in
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a non-violent world, then our affiliations and conflicts are to be expressed and
negotiated through language; through legal and political discourse. If such dis-
course is to be democratic at an international level then we must show that using
a shared^language does not imply shared__yalues^j)i^_beliefs. In other words, lan-
guage need not constrain metaphysics. If we are unable to demonstrate this, then
we are to live in a hegemonic world where democratic international cooperation
is not possible.
I will now sharpen my delineation of this problem and strive to go some
way towards offering a solution. In the course of elaborating these remarks I will
use Wittgenstein's ideas on grammar and naturalism for philosophy in an interna-
tional context. I will do this by paying attention to the specific arguments made
by Jerrold Katz against both the internal naturalism of Chomsky and the full
blown naturalism of an HusserUan phenomenology. In sum, I will question the
moves in philosophy that seek to develop a strong intentional theory of seman-
tics in an attempt to give us a metaphysics of meaning even as the world is be-
coming more overtly interdependent, but also more insistently democratic. Such a
move may be useful if we take globalization to mean standardization. These are
not useful, however, when thinking about meaning from a cosmopolitan, democ-
ratic point of view.
In a recent issue of the Journal of Philosophy, Jerrold Katz raises what he
considers the central problem in twentieth century philosophy. The problem, he
says, was raised by Wittgenstein very near the end of the Tractatiis Logico-
Philosophiciis:
It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can
neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in
the visual field has two different colors at the same time is a contradic-
tion.
These two statements, Katz 1998 argues, each plausible by itself, are none too
plausible when taken together. To help make Wittgenstein's point, Katz offers
the following example:
1) The spot is red and blue.
There is a problem here with the setting of the problem in this way. The terms of
reference namely red and blue have opposing positions on the color wheel. A
naturalized example would have made the problem harder to set in such clean
terms and therefore harder to treat. Thus what if the example, Wittgenstein might
say, Katz had picked had been 'The spot is blue and green'. In that case, Katz
would not have been able to develop as clean an argument against naturalism as
the one he offers.
Nevertheless, Katz 1998 asserts that this statement claiming that the spot is
blue and green is the 'logical product of two elementary statements and hence
according to the first statement in Wittgenstein's formulation of the problem it
cannot be a contradiction. However, it asserts that a 'point in the visual field has
i
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two different colors at the same time,' and hence according to the second state-
ment it is a contradiction. For Katz, the color incompatibility problem 'is a gen-
eral problem about the vocabulary of the language and about all the semantic
properties and relations of the language. 'The problem surfaces,' he says, 'when-
ever we try to explain the logical powers of extra logical words with a symbolism
on which the logical form of elementary propositions affords no basis for their
explanation. Not only did Wittgenstein raise this problem but he imposed a meth-
odological and epistemological constraint on its solution.
It must be possible for the contradiction to show itself entirely in the sym-
bolism. If I say of a patch that it is both red and green, it is certainly at most only
one of these two, and the contradiction must be contained in the sense of the two
propositions. A contradiction, therefore, must be displayed entirely in its symbol-
ism. Furthermore, knowledge of such a contradiction requires apriori semantic
knowledge of its constituent statements. Even though color vocabulary is only a
special case of this problem it offers us what Katz considers the hardest case for
the more general problem of meaning which totally transformed the discipline of
philosophy in the twentieth century. Roughly, the general problem of meaning
color incompatibility serves to exemplify is the tension between intuition and
logic we often find in the ascription of meaning.
Following this, Katz 1998 makes a distinction between solutions and disso-
lutions in addressing philosophical problems. Solutions arise from questioning as-
sumptions but accepting presuppositions. Dissolutions occur when presupposi-
tions themselves are placed in jeopardy. Both Wittgenstein, through the Philoso-
phical Investigations, and W. O. Quine's arguments are dissolutions. Neverthe-
less, he points out, Quine's orientation is scientistic while Wittgenstein's is thera-
peutic. Katz sees his own attempt as a solution through what he calls 'decompo-
sitional semantics'. It is based on retaining a metaphysics of meaning by separat-
ing logic from meaning, and syntax from semantics.
I now take up Quine and Katz's inability to speak to what I think might be-
come the philosophical issue of the twenty-first century. Let us first briefly take
up Quine's theory of the indeterminacy of translation. This thesis rests on the idea
that the richiiess ofjhcxo'''''"^^'-^ '" which janguage is used makes it extremely djf-
ficult to link language-fixed referents.^ TranslaUon between linguistic systems,
then, is indeterminate and therefore, for worldly reasons open to the possibility of
hegemony./ An additional problem, and one that Quine does not address, is that
this hegemony of translation may not be conscious. That even under the most
charitable of intentions, we necessarily map our own metaphysics onto the alien,
usually non-Western, philosophical discourse. Here are two sobering examples.
First, consider how commonplace it is to conflate Buddhism and Christianity. This
occurs despite Buddhism's strenuous efforts to resist God as a transcendental
concept. Or let us take the acceptance of the classification of some languages of
the world as part of the Indo-European family of languages and culture as first
suggested by Sir William Jones. Sir Jones suggested this system of classification
'i
<
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of languages based on the regularities he perceived between Latin, Greek, an
Sanskrit. But, keeping Wittgenstein's remarks on the interdeterminacy of expla
nation in commenting on Frazer's The Golden Bough in mind, and Quine's ow
thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, it might be possible to classify these
languages in ways which would easily resist the label indo-European'. This
brings us to a graver inadequacy in Quine's theory of translation. His theory as-
sumes closed, internally undifferentiated, linguistic systems. While this may remain
a reasonable and productive assumption to make in the formal treatment of lan-
guage, the field of sociolinguistics confronts the assumption with such empirical
force that it is difficult to maintain even for those purposes. In other words, Quine
develops his thesis as a monolingual-monodialectal speaker writing of other
speakers of pure language.
The cautionary reminders about interpretation and explanation assembled
by Wittgenstein and taken to an extreme by Quine certainly alert us to the sig-
nificance of difference in thinking about meaning. However, when we think
about the parallels between Panini's grammar and that of Chomsky, Nagarjuna's
contributions to Mahayana Buddhism and the role of language in Wittgenstein's
thinking about he gap between the ordinary and the real, we come to appreciate
the motivation for finding a universal metaphysics of meaning. Such regularities
draw our attention to the sharedness of human experience. Nevertheless, the
philosophical position we are striving to lay out is a non-hegemonic treatment of
language. Such a treatment would seek to negotiate between incommensurability
on the one hand and the universalization of local concepts on the other.
In his discussion of the metaphysics of meaning, Katz wants to reject
Chomskyan naturalism without letting go of Chomskyan formalism. If expressed
in sufficiently general and formal terms, such an approach should fit the linguistic
facts of all languages. Specifically, Katz wishes to develop a non-naturalistic in-
tentional semanfics based on a Chomskyan definition of grammar: an optimal
generative grammar for a language L which generates all and only well formed
sentences in L. There are three problems with Katz's position. Fiist, while he is
aware of the problems presented by Quine's monolingualism for his thesis of the
indeterminacy of translation, Katz's own attempts at representing bilingualism are
idealized representations based on a monolingual view of language. In other
words, his philosophy of language suffers because it too remains uninformed by
sociolinguistic research which describes the complexity of linguisuc phenome-
non. Katz seeks to block such difficulties by what he calls 'evidential controls' I
when faced with discrepancies in meaning. That is, he relies on extensionality toi
ascribe meaning to ambiguous statements. Finally, despite his valiant attempts to '
delink syntax from semantics, Katz's theory of decompositional semantics relies
on the well-formedness of expressions. Such a reliance on well-formedness is
normative and suggests a presupposed undifferenfiated linguistic system. Such a
hearkening to extensionality weakens, perhaps even undemiines, Katz's attempts
at providing us with an intentional theory of semantics.
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Such a consistent return to extensionality in tlie ascription of meaning is
significant not only for philosophy of language in general, but more specifically,
for our purposes, for doing philosophy in an international context. Let us take the
specific case of English. As the linguist Braj Kachru 2001 points out, English is
indeed the global language. However, to equate this globalization of English with
the emergence of a single, hegemonic, linguistic system is to misunderstand the
creativity involved in the processes of the acquisition and use of English by
populations other than in those places traditionally considered English-speaking.
How does one explain this rather mistaken view of language in use?
Primarily such an error stems, as has been pointed out, from taking language
to be a monolithic system. Even the most cursory examination of English used in
places like England, Canada, the United States, and Australia, reveals enough dif-
ferentiation to warrant the use of terms like 'Australian English,' 'British English,'
and 'American English'. Now consider the widespread use of English in Malay-
sia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Bhutan, the Fiji Islands an so on. To speak of English as
a global language is to speak only in the most economical and, if taken to be de-
scriptive of actual linguistic conditions, deeply erroneous ways. In the attempt to
recognize English as global language while acknowledging the unique ways in
which it is realized within particular contexts, Kachru suggests that it is linguisti-
cally accurate to speak of 'World Englishes'.
It is certainly the case that the spread of English is lied to colonial processes
Avhich dislocated, marginalized, or even erased local linguistic and philosophical
systems. Nevertheless, the language was taken up in different parts of the world
in ways which, to follow Wittgenstein, were tied to local 'forms of life'. It is the
specificity of the ways in which grammar, tied to the life-world, is realized which
makes it possible for us to speak of Jamaican, Kenyan, and Indian English. These
linguistic realizations, on the argument of the sociolinguist, are not impoverished
forms of the norms for English set by British aristocracy, which is only one form
of life among many. Rather, they are complex linguistic systems in themselves. In
. other words, the norms of standard English are not linguistically inherent, but ap-
>Cear so within specific historical contexts.
In addition, the spread of English is often seen as being hegemonic because
the theories which drive explanation link language to power in an overly deter-
ministic manner. The common users of English are represented as oppressed and
alienated from language for historical reasons. Such explanations run the risk of
reproducing the power relations they seek to undermine, for they deny creativity
to the users of language in which these theorists of domination and subordination
wish to argue. Moreover, such a view presupposes a romantic linkage between
an essential 'self" and 'expression'. Regardless of the philosophical position we
take on this presupposition, it is hard to maintain when considering language use
in a world-historical context.
Let us take up the idea of World Englishes, lajiguageJie^J^JoijiUorDiii-of
life, in greater detail. Consider the following example from Indian English. The ut-
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terance "I am going to go" can be said to follow the same rules of syntax as '1 am
going to read,' 'I am going to eat,' 'I am going to run,' and so on. Within the In-
dian context the utterance 'I am going to go,' presents no semantic confusion. A
British or American speaker might need recourse to some Katzian 'evidential cir-
cumstance' in order to make sense of the utterance. By referring to the context,
the utterance could meaningfully interpreted as ' Do not hassle me, I ain leaving,"
'I most definitely, most certainly mean to go," and so on. Even so, the expression M
is an emphatic in these cases as it is not within the context of Indian English. That "
is, in order to make the sentence not only syntactically permissible but also
meaningful we have to rely on extensionality. This example provides us with a
good opportunity to criticize Katz's valiant attempt at developing an intentional
semantics even as it points us to the significance of context in the ascription of
meaning. In other words, this example demonstrates that meaning is made in Eng-
lish in a manner which preserves the idea of a globally spread speech community
while pointing to the local forms of life to which language use is tied.
Kachru's 2001 argument for World Englishes suggests the creative ways in
which people learn and use languages, even under conditions of imperialism.
Such creativity should be far more in evidence after colonialism. Kachru's discus-
sion of language offers another strategy for undertaking international philoso-
phy: for doing philosophy after colonialism. It makes possible, and legitimates,
philosophy in Indian English: the language directly tied to the forms of life out of
which the concepts it seeks to articulate emerge. However, since philosophy is
undertaken in English, these linguistic systems might be different, but are mutu-
ally intelligible. In other words, Kachru's arguments within linguistics make pos-
sible the global articulation of local philosophical concepts. His view of the global
use of English naturalizes the metaphysics of meaning. The possibilities and limi-
tations presented by the spread of English for Indian philosophy fomi the bitter-
sweet legacy of colonialism.
Let us take the case of the modernization of Chinese. In response to com-
municative and educational technologies like typewriters, the printing press, and
the new electronic media, the Chinese writing system has slowly started to
change away from a strictly ideographic system to one that is more alphabetic.
The protocols and regimes of these emerging technologies of communication
might require a shift to sentential syntax, since the architecture of many of these
systems rest on sentential logic. Such emerging shifts in gnimniiir occur as a result
of changing forms of life which require a shared metaphysics in order to share
meaning. Such sharedness, however, does not necessarily imply cultural atrophy, 1
or even death. To insist on such attenuation is not only to refuse the creativity of ^
the users of language, but also the possibility of occupying many metaphysical
positions using one linguistic system. As pointed out so well by Neil Tennant
1997, it is not enough to criticize Whorfian suiprise at the Hopi exhibition of an
Einsteinian metaphysics. It is just as important to note that English speakers are
not doomed to inhabit a non-Einsteinian world; that it is just as easy to say space-
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time as it is to say space and time. In other words, grammar may not be metaphysi-
cal destiny.
Kachru's Hnguistic analyses of English taken up from a Wittgensteinian per-
spective offers hopeful and constructive strategies for doing international phi-
losophy after colonialism. In all the alternate strategies taken up in this essay, In-
dian thought remains inextricably linked to Western philosophy for reasons of
grammar, history, and geography. Most of these strategies are unequal to the task
of giving us a way to think of doing philosophy in a democratic international
context. They remain inadequate primarily because they rely on a monolithic
view of language. Thinking about language and metaphysics in an international
context returns us to Wittgensteinian naturalism. In other words, if naturalism
made for the critical, deconstructive, moments in Wittgenstein's philosophy, it
also opens the door for a therapeutic metaphysics firmly tied to a language and a
grammar.
If Wittgenstein posed the central questions of philosophy in the twentieth
century, as Katz tells us, then he may well be the philosopher we have to turn to
in solving the riddles faced by philosophy in an international, diasporic, context.
But, this should not surprise us at all. After all, it does not take great imagination
to see that Wittgenstein was a multicultural, diasporic, international philosopher.
Wittgenstein was a man who witnessed great suffering around issues of identifi-
cation and exclusion and who thought philosophy was charged with the task of
healing. Seeing him thus enables us to catch a glimpse into the earnestness with
which he argued for thinking about the role of grammar in philosophy, the sig-
nificance of history, and his insistent resistance to a metaphysics, and hence a
politics, too quickly seized upon. The question we are left with is this: Why did
we not naturalize our greatest philosopher of naturalism? Could it be that he is so
hard to read because his philosophical investigations resist a metaphysics tied to
an unreflective monolingual form of life?
Under conditions of more overt forms of globalization, it could well be that
Indian philosophy, as form of non-Western thought, is made an artifact to be dis-
played in the museum of philosophy. The quest then is no longer to seek a way
home to Indian thought. Rather, the idea is to labor intellectually in a manner
which not only resists the 'museumification' of Indian and other philosophical
traditions, but to return philosophy to its tasks proper. Philosophy can no longer
be tied to a singular form of life, but must itself become diasporic and enable us all
to feel at home in the world.
NOTE
An earlier version of this argument was presented to the American Philosophical
Association, Eastern Division, 27 December, 1997, Philadelphia at the Symposium
on International Cooperation chaired by Professor Hilary Putnam. 1 would like to
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thank the discussants, particularly Professor Hilary Putnam and Neil Tennant, for
their thoughtful comments.
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